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159 
IS JUSTICE FOR SALE IN OHIO? AN 
EXAMINATION OF OHIO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM FOCUSING ON 
THE 2000 RACE FOR THE OHIO SUPREME COURT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Is justice for sale in Ohio?” asked a television advertisement in 
October 2000.1  Another advertisement informed voters that “today in 
Ohio, instructors teach and students learn, in spite of Justice Alice 
Resnick.”2  These advertisements are examples of the derogatory judicial 
campaigning that is becoming prevalent in the United States.3 
The cost of judicial campaigning is also steadily increasing.4  For 
example, in Pennsylvania in 1987, the largest sum of money a candidate 
raised was $407,711.5  In seven years, this number had risen to 
$1,848,142.6  These increases were not limited to expenditures by the 
                                                          
 1. Darrel Rowland & James Bradshaw, State Elections Panel Reaffirms Legality of Anti-
Resnick TV Ad, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 2000, at 1D.  This advertisement was produced by 
an independent activist group called Citizens for a Strong Ohio in opposition to Justice Alice Robie 
Resnick’s campaign for the Ohio Supreme Court, although its mission is technically classified as 
“issue advocacy” rather than “express advocacy”.  Id.  See infra note 132 and accompanying text for 
an explanation of these terms.
 
 2. October 25 (visited Feb. 10, 2001) <http://www.ohiochamber.com/court/index.html>. 
 3. See Charles D. Clausen, The Long and Winding Road: Political and Campaign Ethics 
Rules for Wisconsin Judges, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1999). This is not the first time that Justice 
Resnick herself has been attacked.  Id.  In a prior race against Judge Sara Harper, Harper ran a 
derogatory ad against Resnick.  Id.  The ad read: 
On the Ohio Supreme Court, one Justice has a problem.  It’s money.  Most of 
Resnick’s money comes from just one place, the plaintiff lawyers who sue, sue, 
sue.  Over $300,000.00 just from them.  This small group of suing lawyers 
wants Resnick with her liberal rulings to make it easier for them to collect 
millions in fees.  It’s time for a change to Judge Sara Harper.  Recommended, 
endorsed, highly rated, twenty years as a Judge, Marine Corps Lieutenant 
Colonel.  Judge Sara Harper. 
Id.
 
 4. Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution 
and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 136 (1998). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  These are not the only examples of abuse in the state of Pennsylvania.  In 1986, 
expenditures for the race for chief justice had risen to $2,700,000 from $100,000 in 1980.  Id. 
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candidates themselves.7  In 1985, the race for the Texas Supreme Court 
was heavily funded by two corporations vying to secure seats on the 
bench.8  The problem of outside expenditures was also prevalent in the 
2000 race for the Ohio Supreme Court.9 
Part II of this comment will focus on the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court 
campaign between Alice Robie Resnick and Terrence O’Donnell as an 
example of current problems in judicial campaigning.10  The effect of 
this campaign and of similar other campaigns on the judicial system and 
public perceptions of justice will be explored in Part III.11  Part IV will 
identify and discuss limits to reforming the system.12  Finally, Part V 
will explore possible solutions to this growing problem, including 
campaign regulation13 and merit selection and retention.14  Part VI will 
conclude with a summary of the points that were addressed. 
II.  THE RESNICK-O’DONNELL RACE 
A.  Citizens for a Strong Ohio Advertising Campaign 
Citizens for a Strong Ohio (Citizens) is a non-profit organization 
that is a branch of the Ohio Chamber of Commerce (Chamber).15  This 
                                                          
 7. Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examining the 
First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 71 
(1997). 
 8. Id.  Penzoil contributed $315,000 and Texaco contributed $72,700.  Id.  These two entities 
were then involved in litigation in the court and may have been attempting to gain leverage for their 
respective cases.  Id.  The court eventually ruled for Penzoil.  Id. 
 9. This race was dominated by the Ohio and United States Chambers of Commerce.  Randy 
Ludlow, Justice Resnick Survives TV Ad Salvos, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 8, 2000, at 15A.  One 
commentator stated that “[b]y now, O’Donnell and Resnick appear to be little more than 
underfunded spectators in their own campaigns.”  Profile: Supreme Court Race in the State of Ohio 
(NPR radio broadcast Nov. 3, 2000). 
 10. See infra notes 15-73 and accompanying text.  Although Justice Resnick eventually won 
reelection, the campaign leading to this result was a disturbing scene.  See Ludlow, supra note 9, at 
15A.  After the election, Resnick herself lamented, “I’m not a vindictive person, but they really did 
attack my honor and integrity.”  Mike Wagner, Despite Negative Ads, Resnick Retains Seat, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 2000, at 1A.  Although the ads were not successful in Ohio, the 
Chamber’s efforts did pay off in several other states, such as Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi and 
Indiana.  Associated Press, Chamber’s Ads Efforts Failed in Ohio, Worked in Other States, 
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Nov. 9, 2000, at DS6.  The Chamber considered its 
efforts to be a victory well worth the $6-7 million investments.  Id. 
 
 11. See infra notes 74-119 and accompanying text.
 
 12. See infra notes 120-135 and accompanying text.
 
 13. See infra notes 136-155 and accompanying text.
 
 14. See infra notes 156-170 and accompanying text.
 
 15. William Hershey, Court Election Hottest, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 22, 2000, at 1A.  
The Ohio Chamber of Commerce is a organization of businesses and business owners.  Ohio 
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division of the Chamber formed in order to express its opinions on the 
2001 Ohio Supreme Court race.16  The group is officially engaged only 
in issue advocacy and is therefore not subject to campaign disclosure 
requirements.17  However, the group’s involvement in the campaign was 
extensive, and its advocacy was, at best, narrowly related to business 
issues.18 
The Chamber of Commerce did not favor the re-election of Justice 
Resnick because of previous rulings that the Chamber considered to be 
anti-business.19  The decision that Chamber found most offensive was 
that of State ex. rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward.20  This 
decision struck down legislation that placed a limit on the amount of 
damages that plaintiffs could recover in tort cases.21  Businesses favored 
this legislation because it would have limited the amount that they would 
likely pay as tort defendants.22  The Chamber also opposed Resnick’s 
opinion in DeRolph v. State of Ohio23 which held that the Ohio system of 
                                                          
Chamber of Commerce
 (visited Feb. 10, 2001) 
<http://www.ohiochamber.com/chamber/chamber.html>.  Its primary purposes include presenting 
“the business perspective” on issues to the Ohio legislature.  Id.  The group also aims to elect 
legislators that are favorable to business objectives.  Id.  They hope to create a business climate in 
Ohio that is “responsive to expansion and growth.”  Id.
 
 16. James Bradshaw, O’Donnell Laments Secret Ads, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 2000, at 
1B.
 
 17. See, e.g, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.105 (B)(1) (Anderson 2000).  This statute, like 
others regarding campaign disclosures, applies only to groups “advocating the election or defeat of 
an identified candidate.”  § 3517.105(B)(1).  This distinction is based on First Amendment 
overbreadth concerns.  See infra notes 120-34 and accompanying text. 
One confirmed supporter of the group is Ohio governor, Robert Taft.  Alan Johnson & James 
Bradshaw, Ads Still Hot Topic in Race for Court Seat, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 26, 2000, at 1C.  
Governor Taft has admitted telephoning people and asking for contributions to the group.  Id.  
Although he did not apologize for helping to fund the group, he did concede that the ads were 
inappropriate.  Id.
 
 18. See infra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
 
 19. Bradshaw, supra note 16, at 1B.  This conclusion was based on studies released in 1996 
and 1997.  Id.  Only one other member of the court, Andrew Douglas, was considered to be more 
anti-business than Justice Resnick.  Id.
 
 20. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
 
 21. Id. at 1095 .  The legislation limited non-economic damages to $250,000 or three times 
the economic damages, whichever was greater.  Id. at 1092.  When the plaintiff was permanently 
disabled, the legislation would allow him to recover $1 million, or $35,000 times the number of 
years the plaintiff was expected to live, whichever was greater.  Id.  The court determined that these 
caps on tort recovery were unconstitutional because they violated citizens’ right of due process.  Id.  
The limits that the legislature attempted to create were “unreasonable and arbitrary.”  Id.  The court 
also scolded the legislature for essentially reenacting a piece of legislation that is substantially 
similar to legislation that the court had previously declared to be unconstitutional for the same 
reasons.  Id. at 1095. 
 22. Hershey, supra note 15, at 1A.
 
 23. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000). 
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public school funding was unconstitutional.24  Because the Chamber of 
Commerce and Citizens considered Justice Resnick to be an “activist” 
and “anti-business,” they opposed her re-election to the Ohio Supreme 
Court. 
Citizens’ for a Strong Ohio’s first anti-Resnick advertisement began 
airing on October 11, 2000.25  The advertisement depicted lady justice 
holding the traditional scales of justice.26  After someone dumped a load 
of money onto one side of the scales, she peeked out from behind her 
blindfold and tipped the scales in that direction.27  The voice in the 
background informed viewers that Justice Resnick has received over 
$750,000 from personal injury lawyers since 1994 and suggested that 
these donations have caused her to rule in favor of plaintiffs in more 
than 70 percent of cases.28  The voice also told voters that Justice 
Resnick is the only Supreme Court Justice to ever reverse herself.29  The 
advertisement concluded by asking voters, “Is Justice for Sale in Ohio?  
You decide.”30 
The advertisement based these allegations on Episcopal Retirement 
Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Industrial Relations.31  The court 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 999-1000.  Ohio schools are funded by a complex system that relies primarily on 
property tax revenues generated in the school district.  Id. at 999.  This system was held to be 
unconstitutional because the Ohio Constitution requires a “thorough and efficient” method of 
common schooling.  OHIO CONST., art. VI, § 2.  Because of the lack of funding in some areas, some 
schools barely had enough funds to operate.  DeRolph, 728 N.E.2d at 998.  The Chamber of 
Commerce and Citizens for a Strong Ohio are examples of groups that attack judicial candidates 
based on the results rather than the merits of their decisions.  See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., 
Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas,
 17 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 281, 314 (1995).
 
 25. October 11 (visited Feb. 10, 2001) <http://www.ohiochamber.com/court/news2.html>.
 
 26. Group Asks Elections Commission to Rule Ad Campaign Illegal, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWSWIRES, Oct. 26, 2000.
 
 27. Id.
 
 28. See October 11 supra note 25.  This information was based on Chamber of Commerce 
studies involving limited subjects such as employment, medical malpractice and environmental 
issues.  Bradshaw, supra note 16 at 1B.  Another study conducted by Rev. Werner Lange of the 
Akron Clean Money Campaign concluded that Justice Resnick only voted in favor of her campaign 
contributors on 56.2% of cases.  Id.
 
 29. Id.  For an analysis of this allegation and its misleading character see infra notes 31-37 
and accompanying text.
 
 30. See October 11 supra note 25. 
 31. Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 575 N.E.2d 134 
(Ohio 1991), reh’g granted, 578 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio 1991), reh’g vacated, 582 N.E.2d 606 (Ohio 
1991).  The issue in this case was whether a privately owned nursing home was required to pay 
construction workers the state prevailing wage when the remodeling project was funded by county 
owned bonds.  Id. at 136.  In the first case, the Court held that the nursing home did not have to pay 
the prevailing wage because the project was not a “public improvement.”  Id. at 135.  The project 
was not considered to be a public improvement because the nursing home controlled the project, the 
4
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first decided this case on August 14, 199132 at which time Justice 
Resnick joined in the majority opinion.33  On August 26, 1991, the Ohio 
State Building and Construction Trade Council, who had filed an amicus 
brief in the original case, filed a motion for reconsideration.34  The court 
denied the motion but granted a rehearing sua sponte on October 8, 
1991.35  The court vacated the decision to grant the rehearing on 
December 6, 1991.36  Justice Resnick clearly was not given the 
opportunity to switch her vote as the case was never reheard and the 
original decision remained binding on the parties.37 
On October 25, 2000, Citizens began airing another anti-Resnick 
television advertisement.38  This advertisement depicted students fooling 
around in an unattended classroom.39  The announcer described how a 
decision by Justice Resnick blocked the legislature’s effort to ensure that 
                                                          
county did not benefit from nor have an interest in the project.  Id. at 137-38.  This decision was 
favorable to business organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce because building costs 
would be lower if businesses were not forced to pay the state prevailing wage.
 
 32. Id. at 135.
 
 33. Id. at 139.  The court was split four-three with Chief Justice Moyer, Justice Holmes, 
Justice Wright and Justice Resnick in the majority and Justice Sweeney, Justice Douglas and Justice 
Brown dissenting.  Id.
 
 34. Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 582 N.E.2d 606, 609 
(Ohio 1991) (Resnick, J., dissenting).
 
 35. Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 578 N.E.2d 819 
(Ohio 1991). The decision to grant the rehearing was also a four-three decision with Justice 
Sweeney, Justice Douglas, Justice Brown and Justice Resnick granting the rehearing and Chief 
Justice Moyer, Justice Holmes and Justice Wright dissenting.  Id.  This appears to be the vote on 
which the advertisement based its claim that Justice Resnick switched her vote. Andrew Welsh-
Huggins, U.S. Chamber Intervenes in Resnick-O’Donnell Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, 
Oct. 26, 2000.  After this decision, the court, sua sponte, made a motion for the “recusal and or 
disqualification of Justice Alice Robie Resnick” on Nov. 13, 1991.  579 N.E.2d 1392 (Ohio 1991).  
The motion was stricken the same day.  Id.  The basis for making and striking this motion was not 
provided.
 
 36. Episcopal, 582 N.E.2d 606 (Ohio 1991).  This decision was once again by a vote of four 
to three.  Chief Justice Moyer, Justice Holmes, Justice Wright and Justice Brown voted in the 
majority.  Justice Sweeney, Justice Douglas and Justice Resnick dissented.  Id.  Interestingly, Justice 
Brown was the justice who literally switched his vote.  He voted to grant the rehearing on October 
8, 578 N.E.2d 819, and to deny the rehearing on December 6, 582 N.E.2d 606. 
 
 37. Episcopal, 582 N.E.2d 606.  But see 582 N.E.2d 606, 610-11 (Resnick, J., dissenting).  In 
her dissenting opinion Justice Resnick states “that this court possesses inherent authority to correct a 
miscarriage of justice and should do so in a timely manner.  The citizens of Ohio cannot afford the 
luxury of waiting for another case identical to this one to come before us.”  Id.  Although it does not 
directly identify this case as a “miscarriage of justice” or specifically state how she would have 
voted upon rehearing, this statement suggests that Resnick would have changed her vote if given an 
opportunity to do so.  Id.
 
 38. See October 25, supra note 2. 
 39. Spencer Hunt, Campaign 2000; Anti-Resnick Ad Pulled, Replaced, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER, Oct. 25, 2000, at B2.
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teachers spend more time in the classroom.40  As the screen changes to 
the same classroom of students listening attentively to their teacher, the 
announcer explained that the United States Supreme Court overturned 
that decision.41  Finally, the commercial concluded, “[s]o today in Ohio, 
instructors teach and students learn, in spite of Justice Alice Resnick.”42 
The allegations in this advertisement were loosely based on the case 
of American Association of University Professors v. Central State 
University.43
  This case involved a statute that prohibited university 
professors from bargaining collectively about their workloads in order to 
ensure that professors spent more time in the classroom.44  The Ohio 
Supreme Court struck down the statute as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.45  The United States Supreme Court later reversed 
                                                          
 40. Id.
 
 41. Id.  The commercial literally claimed that “The United States Supreme Court stood up for 
common sense and overturned Resnick’s opinion.”  Id.
 
 42. See October 25, supra note 2.  The Resnick campaign, the Democratic Party, and other 
supporters did create television commercials to combat the negative effects of these commercials.  
Id.
  Resnick’s commercials emphasized her independence and willingness to resist the pressure of 
special interest groups.  Id.  Although these ads did derogate the special interest groups for 
dispensing  misleading information, they did not disparage O’Donnell in any way.  Id.  O’Donnell 
himself also did not support this type of campaigning from interest groups.  Bradshaw, supra note 
16, at 1B.  He stated that “I want to run a positive campaign.  I have not spoken negatively about my 
opponent.”  Id.
 
 43. American Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Central State Univ., 
699 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio 1998), rev’d, 526 U.S. 124 (1999), remanded to, 717 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 
1999).
 
 44. University Professors, 699 N.E.2d at 465-66.  OHIO REV. CODE § 3345.45 provided that: 
On or before January 1, 1994, the Ohio board of regents jointly with all state 
universities, as defined in section 3345.011 of the Revised Code, shall develop 
standards for instructional workloads for full-time and part-time faculty in 
keeping with the universities’ missions and with special emphasis on the 
undergraduate learning experience.  The standards shall contain clear guidelines 
for institutions to determine a range of acceptable undergraduate teaching by 
faculty.  On or before June 30, 1994, the board of trustees of each state 
university shall take formal action to adopt a faculty workload policy consistent 
with the standards developed under this section.  Notwithstanding section 
4117.08 of the Revised Code, the policies adopted under this section are not 
appropriate subjects for collective bargaining.  Notwithstanding division (A) of 
section 4117.10 of the Revised Code, any policy adopted under this section by 
a board of trustees prevails over any conflicting provisions of any collective 
bargaining agreement between an employees organization and that board of 
trustees. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.45 (West 2001).
 
 45. University Professors, 699 N.E.2d at 464.  Because this statute did not discriminate 
against a protected class or infringe upon a fundamental right, it was subject only to minimal 
scrutiny.  Id. at 468.  The court concluded that the statute did serve a legitimate government interest.  
Id.
  However, the statute was not rationally related to its goal of increasing classroom time.  Id. at 
470.  After looking at numerous reports, the court concluded that none of these reports linked 
6
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this decision as a misapplication of federal law.46  Although Justice 
Resnick wrote an opinion that was reversed by the United States 
Supreme Court, the implications that the advertisement seems to draw 
from this case are improper.  Justice Resnick’s opinion was not entirely 
implausible.47 Furthermore, reversal by the United States Supreme Court 
is not uncommon.  Again, the deceptive advertising campaign 
misrepresented the facts.48 
B.  United States Chamber of Commerce Advertisement 
The United States Chamber of Commerce is similar to Chamber in 
that it is a non-profit organization of businesses.49  It is also exempt from 
mandatory disclosure requirements because it is not classified as a 
political action committee.50  Like Chamber, the United States Chamber 
of Commerce televised advertisements relating to the Resnick-
O’Donnell race.51  The United States Chamber’s advertisement was 
similar to Citizens’ first commercial.52  It depicted a female judge in a 
                                                          
collective bargaining to the decline in classroom time.  Id. at 469.  Actually the reports indicated 
that teachers would rather spend more time in the classroom than researching and would likely 
bargain for this benefit.  Id. at 470.
 
 46. Central State Univ. v. American Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter, 
526 U.S. 124, 129 (1999).  The Court concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court had misapplied 
federal law in their prior decision.  Id. at 127.  The statute and its goal were rationally related in that 
“the policy animating the law would have been undercut and likely varied if it were subject to 
collective bargaining.”  Id. at 128.  The court also pointed out that the state did not have an 
obligation to produce evidence that the two were causally related.  Id 
 
 47. The court was presented with several studies indicating other causes of the decline in 
classroom time and none which indicated that collective bargaining was the cause.  University 
Professors, 699 N.E.2d at 469.  Three other Ohio Supreme Court Justices, Justice Sweeney, Justice 
Pfeifer at Justice Douglas, joined in her judgment.  Id. at 470.  Also Justice Stevens of the United 
States Supreme Court agreed with Justice Resnick.  Central State, 526 U.S. 124, 130 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
 
 48. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.  The case itself did not directly involve 
students or education.  It was merely about the working conditions of university professors. 669 
N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio 1991). The ad was also misleading in that it failed to specify that the case 
involved only teachers at the collegiate level rather than in elementary or secondary school.  Hunt, 
supra note 39, at B2.  It is not difficult for advocacy groups to present facts to the public in a 
deceptive manner.  Clausen, supra note 3, at 52.  (“Even truthful statements, however, can be 
seriously misleading, through incompleteness, innuendo, or otherwise.  When the electorate is 
misled, the electorate is disserved, whether the misleading occurs through conscious false statement 
or carefully crafted half-truths, smears, irrelevancies, or distortions”).
 
 49. Welsh-Huggins, supra note 35. 
 50. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  The group engages merely in issue advocacy 
and does not use express words of advocacy in its advertisements.  Id. at 44.
 
 51. Welsh-Huggins, supra note 35.  The group has also engaged in issue advocacy regarding 
the state Supreme Court race in Michigan and Mississippi.  Id.
 
 52. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
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black robe sitting at her desk.53  She checked the box for the defendant 
on a voting form.54  After someone dumped a pile of cash on her desk, 
she changed her vote to the plaintiff’s side.55  The announcer identified 
the same concerns about campaign contributions by personal injury 
lawyers that were espoused by Citizens’ commercial.56  Again these 
allegations were based on Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio 
Department of Industrial Relations57
 and were again misleading.58 
C.  Challenges to these Campaign Practices 
On October 17, 2000, Common Cause Ohio59 filed a formal 
complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission60 based on Citizens’ 
commercials.61  The complaint alleged that Citizens was actually a 
political action committee and, therefore, required to make mandatory 
disclosures.62  A panel of three found that there was not probable cause 
to believe that Citizens was a political action committee and denied 
Common Cause’s petition.63  This decision was based on Buckley v. 
                                                          
 53. Welsh-Huggins, supra note 35.
 
 54. Id.
 
 55. Id.
 
 56. October 27, (visited Feb. 10, 2001) 
<http://www.ohiochamber.com/chamber/chamber.html>.
 
 57. Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 575 N.E.2d 134 
(Ohio 1991), reh’g granted, 578 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio 1991), reh’g vacated, 582 N.E.2d 606 (Ohio 
1991). 
 58. Welsh-Huggins, supra note 35.  See also supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
 
 59. Common Cause Ohio is a non-profit organization that is dedicated to restoring ethics in 
government.  Introduction (visited Feb. 11, 2001) 
<http://www.commoncause.org/states/ohio/intro.html>.  This group has been active in the area of 
campaign finance reform.  Id.  The group also claims to have been a major factor in pushing the 
Ohio Secretary of State to require that campaign disclosure forms be accessible through the internet.  
Id.
  Common Cause has almost 250,000 members nationwide with the Ohio branch consisting of 
about 5,400.  Id.
 
 60. The Ohio Elections Commission is the administrative body that investigates and rules on 
complaints relating to elections.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.153(A) (West 2001).  This body 
also has the power to recommend legislation and issue advisory opinions.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3517.153(D) (West 2001).  The Commission is composed of seven members.  OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3517.152 (West 2001).  Six members of the commission are appointed by the governor.  Id.  
The governor appoints three commissioners from each list of five potential candidates submitted by 
the two prevailing political parties.  Id.  The six appointed members will then elect the seventh 
member by majority vote.  Id.  This procedure ensures that the commission is not a partisan body.  
Id.
 
 61. October 18 (visited Feb. 10, 2001) 
<http://www.ohiochamber.com/chamber/chamber.html>.
 
 62. Id.
 
 63. Group Asks Elections Commission to Rule Ad Campaign Illegal, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWSWIRES, Oct. 26, 2000.
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Valeo64
 which seemed to require that an advertisement contain magic 
words such as “vote for” or “defeat” in order to be classified as express 
advocacy.65 
A second complaint by Alliance for Democracy66 was filed with the 
commission against Citizens.67  This complaint was combined with 
another filed by Common Cause Ohio against the United States 
Chamber of Commerce.68  Initially a three member panel concluded that 
there was no probable cause to believe that a violation occurred.69  
However, on rehearing by another panel, the Commission voted three-
two that probable cause existed.70  This change was caused by a 
November decision of a Mississippi District Court judge.71  The 
                                                          
 64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  This lengthy per curium opinion thoroughly 
analyzed the constitutionality of comprehensive federal election reform legislation.  Id.  The initial 
reform legislation was passed in response to an advertisement in the New York Times advocating 
the impeachment of President Nixon for the bombing of Cambodia.  Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. 
Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 AKRON L. REV. 7, 10-11 (1999).  
 
 65. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Perspective: Ruling’s “Magic Words” Clause Decides Elections 
Complaints, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Oct. 30, 2000.  This decision was later affirmed by 
the entire commission.  Id.  If these ads had been run by an opposing candidate rather than an 
independent group, the ads would almost certainly be illegal campaign practices.  See In re 
Complaint Against Harper, 673 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio 1996).  This case involved a derogatory ad run 
by Judge Harper against Justice Resnick.  See supra note 3.  Here the court held that these ads 
violated Canons 2(A) and 7(B)(1)(a) of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct.  Harper, 673 N.E.2d at 
1268.  Because these ads are likely to have the same effect on judicial integrity, it make little sense 
that they should be treated differently simply because of their source.  Clausen, supra note 3, at 56.
 
 66. Alliance for Democracy is a non-profit organization with about 2,500 members.  We the 
People, Alliance for Democracy
 (visited Feb. 11, 2001) <http://www.afd-online.org/>.  “The 
mission of the Alliance for Democracy is to free all people from corporate domination of politics, 
economics, the environment, culture and information; to establish true democracy; and to create a 
just society with a sustainable, equitable economy.”  Id.  The group believes that large corporations 
control almost every aspect of life and perpetuate the aggregation of wealth and therefore must be 
stopped before true democracy can exist again.  Id.  
 
 67. James Bradshaw, New Hearing Sought on Anti-Resnick Ads, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 
2, 2000, at 11C.
 
 68. Ohio Election Comm’n, Probable Cause Panel Minutes, Nov. 6, 2000 (unpublished 
minutes from commission meeting, can be located at the Office of the Ohio Elections Commission, 
Wyandotte Building, 21 W. Broad St., Columbus, Ohio) [hereinafter Probable Cause Panel 
Minutes].
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.
 
 71. Id.  See also Jim Bebbington, Mississippi Case Cited in Court Race Complaint, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 2000, at 5B.  In this case U.S. District Court Judge Henry Wingate decided 
that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ads in Mississippi constituted express advocacy and ordered 
the Chamber to make campaign disclosures despite the fact that the ads did not use the magic words 
of express advocacy.  Id.  Because this judge found a violation without express words of advocacy, 
the Commission concluded that probable cause of a violation did exist.  Probable Cause Panel 
Minutes, supra note 68.  The Commission had previously relied on the bright line magic words 
standard.  Bebbington, at 5B.  Because this District Court Judge was willing to expand the 
definition, the commission concluded that a violation could have occurred in this case as well.  
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Mississippi judge held that a Chamber of Commerce advertisement was 
express advocacy even though it did not use the magic words when 
advocating.72  A hearing was held on April 4, 2001, before the full 
Commission to determine whether a violation in fact occurred.73 
III.  THE EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 
As the example of the recent Resnick-O’Donnell race illustrates, 
judicial campaigns can be fraught with problems.74  Commentators have 
long argued that judicial positions are not appropriate for adversarial 
elections.75  The most common reason for opposition to the judicial 
election process is that the appearance of impropriety will cause the 
public to lose faith in the judiciary.76  Commentators are also concerned 
that judges may engage in acts of actual impropriety to garner campaign 
support or to sway public opinion.77  These two concerns will be fully 
explored in the subsequent sections. 
                                                          
Probable Cause Panel Minutes, supra note 68. 
 72. Id.  See also Bigger Business Role in Judicial Elections Stirs Controversy, FED. & ST. 
INS. WK., Nov. 6, 2000 [hereinafter Bigger Business].  Judge Wingate concluded that although the 
advertisements did not use the “magic words,” they clearly advocated for the election of certain 
candidates.  Id.  The ad described these candidates as justices who would “use common sense, 
ensure prompt adjudication of death penalty cases and uphold victim’s rights.”  Id.  These words 
could only be interpreted as advocating the election of a particular candidate.  Id.  The commercial 
also urged viewers to visit its website which identifies the Litigation Fairness Campaign as an 
organization that is “dedicated to mobilizing concerned citizens like you to help us fight for more 
fairness against this ever increasing tidal wave of new, frivolous and expensive lawsuits.”  America 
Needs Your Help
 (visited Feb. 18, 2000) <http://www.litigationfairness.org/Index_hiu.htm>. 
This particular advertisement was sponsored by the United States Chamber of Commerce Institute 
for Legal Reform and its affiliate, Litigation Fairness Campaign.  Bigger Business supra note 72.  
These groups intend to combat the influence that unions and trial lawyers have over judicial 
elections.  Trial Lawyers, Unions Target Court Races Money Pours Into Judicial Campaigns (April 
2000) <http://www.uschamber.com/Institute+for+Legal+Reform/_Articles/_Trial+Lawyers. htm>.  
“Business cannot sit on the sidelines and leave the judicial selection process solely in the hands of 
the trial lawyers. If we do nothing, then a ‘fair hearing’ for business will be a thing of the past. All 
anyone wants - and deserves - is competent and impartial judges,” says Jim Wootton, president of 
the Institute.  Id
 
 73. Telephone interview with Betty Springer, Secretary of the Ohio Elections Commission 
(Feb. 16, 2001).  The Ohio Elections Commission has the authority to hear cases under Ohio Rev. 
Code § 3517.156(C)(2) which provides that if the panel determines there is probable cause “it shall 
refer the complaint to the full commission, and the full commission shall hold a hearing.”  OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.156(C)(2) (West 2001).
 
 74. See supra notes 15-73 and accompanying text.
 
 75. See, e.g., Averill, Jr., supra note 24, at 315 (arguing that it is not elections in themselves 
that are detrimental to judicial integrity, but that “[i]t is the advocacy for the position that makes 
these elections so threatening to the judicial system and to judicial independence”).
 
 76. See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
 
 77. See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
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A.  The Importance of Impartiality 
The judicial branch has traditionally been detached from American 
political life.78  The United States Constitution requires that federal 
judges be appointed.79  These judges also have lifetime tenure in their 
offices.80  The purpose of these protections are to ensure that the 
judiciary is an independent body that would protect and enforce the 
Constitution.81  The Framers of the Constitution considered impartiality 
and its appearance to be essential enough to remove the judiciary from 
popular elections.82 
The appearance of impartiality remains essential to the judicial 
system today.83  The purpose of the judicial system is not to reflect 
public opinion,84 but to uniformly apply the public will to diverse factual 
                                                          
 78. Martha W. Barnett, The 1997-98 Florida Constitution Revision Commission: Judicial 
Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L. REV. 411, 415 (2000).  Barnett traces the history of judicial 
selection plans which began with all states using appointment rather than election to select judges.  
Id.
  This lasted until the 1830’s when many states began converting to judicial elections.  Id.  
Currently sixteen states use merit selection and retention, twenty-one use elections (8 being partisan 
and 13 non-partisan), nine use merit selection and another method and four use pure appointment.  
Id. at 416.
 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 provides that “The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1.
 
 81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).  The Framers 
believed that this method of nomination and approval was necessary to ensure that the judiciary was 
responsive neither to the president nor the legislature.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 457 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).  The Senate would prevent the President from appointing 
unfit persons for improper purposes.  Id.  The Senate likewise would not unnecessarily oppose a 
nominee in favor of another because they could not be sure who the president’s next nominee would 
be.  Id.  The Framers also considered lifetime tenure to be essential to the independence of the 
judiciary.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).  
“[I]t would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful 
guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major 
voice of the community.”  Id. at 470. 
 
 82. Id. at 471.  
 
 83. Barnett, supra note 78, at 414 (2000) (pointing out that proponents of judicial 
independence argue that “without such independence, judges would be beholden to transitory 
popular whim and its partisans”).  Barnett also identifies that this independence must be somewhat 
balanced against accountability in judicial action.  Id.  See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978) (identifying that public confidence in the competence of the 
judiciary is also essential to the proper functioning of the judicial branch as a whole).
 
 84. Donald W. Jackson & James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Money and Politics in Judicial 
Elections: The 1988 Election of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, 74 JUDICATURE 184, 
184 (1991) (arguing that although people expect legislators to reflect the interests of their 
11
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situations as identified by the legislature.85  It is essential, therefore, that 
judges are driven solely by the application of existing law rather than the 
creation of new policy.86  Judges would be unable to fulfill their purpose 
in our system of government without the appearance of impartiality.87 
B.  The Appearance of Impropriety 
Judicial campaigns could create the appearance of impropriety in a 
number of ways.88  As the anti-Resnick advertisements did, campaigns 
could directly call the impartiality of the judge into question.89  Such 
allegations may be untrue and unsubstantiated, 90 but they still have an 
effect on public perception.91  Voters are not likely to know much about 
judicial candidates prior to an election.92  What they learn through 
judicial campaigning is likely to shape their opinions about the 
                                                          
supporters, this is not the traditional role of judges).
 
 85. Matthew J. O’Hara, Note & Comment, Restriction of Judicial Election Candidates’ Free 
Speech Rights after Buckley: A Compelling Constitutional Limitation?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 197, 
197 (1994) (“the notion of an independent, impartial judiciary that decides cases based on their 
factual and legal merits, and not an on any other considerations, is fundamental to our common law 
tradition”). 
 
 86. Levien supra note 7, at 71. 
 87. Id.  Fortunately in response to a recent survey seventy-five percent of respondents stated 
that they did have faith in the United States Supreme Court and in their various local state courts.  
Clausen, supra note 3, at 576. 
 
 88. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.  Judges running for other political offices 
may also create the appearance of partiality.  Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n of the State of La., 565 
F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977).  While running for another political office, judges may be tempted to 
make rulings in favor of their contributors or decisions that would favor their political agendas.  Id.  
In order to avoid this problem, Louisiana enacted a law requiring judges to resign their judicial 
positions before seeking another political office.  Id. at 297.  The court upheld this restriction as a 
reasonably necessary means to prevent undue influence.  Id. at 303.
 
 89. See supra notes 15-73 and accompanying text.
 
 90. The anti-Resnick campaign may be an example of such a practice.  One study has 
suggested that Justice Resnick is in fact the most independent Justice currently serving on the Ohio 
Supreme Court.  Sandy Theis & T.C. Brown, U.S. Chamber Pours $1 Million into Attack on 
Resnick, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 27, 2000, at 1A.
 
 91. The Ohio State Bar Association disparages the ads as “an attack of the integrity of the 
supreme court and our entire judicial system.”  Editorial, Anti-Resnick Ads Cry for Full Review, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 23 2000, at 6A.  Even untrue and unsubstantiated accusations could 
have an effect on the public’s perception of judges.  Landmark Communications, Inc. v.Virginia, 
435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978).  In this case, Virginia law prohibited the release of information regarding 
the proceedings of the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission which investigated 
complaints against judges.  Id. at 830.  This law was intended to protect the judiciary from suffering 
because of claims that may later be proven to be groundless.  Id. at 835.  Although the Court 
recognized this a laudable goal, the law was struck down as a violation of the First Amendment.  Id. 
at 845. 
 92. Barnett, supra note 78, at 418.  This problem is accentuated by the fact that Codes of 
Judicial Conduct often prevent judges from making their opinions known.  Id.
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candidates.93  If judicial campaign materials attack the impartiality of a 
candidate, the public is likely to accept that representation and may 
attribute it to the judicial system as a whole.94 
Campaign contributions could also easily lead to the appearance of 
impropriety.95  Lawyers who appear before these judges are often the 
largest contributors to their campaigns.96  Although we trust judges to be 
impartial, one cannot help but speculate whether these contributions 
influence judicial decision making.97  It is conceivable that judges will 
be aware of these monetary contributions and the need to secure them 
again for the following election when making judicial decisions.98  
Campaign disclosures help to combat this problem, but the possibility 
for impropriety remains.99 
                                                          
 93. Id.
 
 94. Jennifer L. Brunner, Comment, Separation of Power as a Basis for Restriant on a Free 
Speaking Judiciary and the Implementation of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in Ohio as 
a Model for Other States, 1999 DET. C. L. REV. 729, (1999).  Brunner cites a study of Ohio citizens 
to which twenty-five percent of respondents stated that the conduct of judicial candidates and ads 
about judicial candidates tend to “diminish respect for judges in Ohio.”  Id. at 738-39.  During the 
campaign, Resnick herself expressed concerns about the ads’ effect on the judicial system.  John 
Seewer, Justice Targeted by Pro-Business Group Thinks Ads Will Backfire, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 
Oct. 30, 2000, at 3B.  Resnick did not suffer from these derogatory statements as she prevailed in 
the November election.  Ludlow, supra note 9, at 15A.  This could however be attributable to other 
phenomena such as her incumbency or pure name recognition.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 
137 (identifying name recognition as an asset that few judicial candidates have when entering a 
race). 
 
 95. Averill, Jr., supra note 24, at 302 (arguing that suspicions of favoritism are inevitable in 
judicial elections).
 
 96. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 133 (arguing that campaign and expenditure limits are the 
only way to effectively curb the appearance of impropriety).  Chemerinsky does not however 
espouse that lawyers should be prohibited from contributing to judicial campaigns.  Id. at 147.  This 
solution would be particularly inequitable in areas of law such as personal injury where plaintiffs’ 
contributors would come mainly from lawyers and defendants’ contributions would not.  Id.
 
 97. John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Strike One, Strike Two . . . : The History of and 
Prospect for Judicial Reform in Ohio, 75 JUDICATURE 193, 196 (1992).  This effect may also be 
supplemented by the contributors’ expectations.  Id.  “People don’t contribute large sums of money 
and expect the other guy to be treated fairly.”  Id. quoting Bill Weisenberg, Ohio Bar Association 
Director of Govt. Affairs.  One study indicates that contributors themselves say that they do not 
expect favorable decisions in return for their contributions but that other contributors do.  Jackson, 
supra
 note 84, at 189. 
Some argue that disqualifying judges from hearing the cases of their contributors may be a solution 
to this problem.  Clausen, supra note 3, at 10.  This, however, could discourage lawyers, who are 
most knowledgeable about the judicial candidates, from making contributions.  Id.  Disqualification 
may also disadvantage judges who would be forced to decide between trying to finance their 
campaigns alone and being required to disqualify themselves in a large number of cases.  See id. at 
11.
 
 98. Clausen, supra note 3, at 64-65 (identifying the possibility that the public will perceive 
that judges are economically reliant on their contributors). 
 
 99. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 145.  The theory behind mandatory campaign disclosures is 
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Indirect advocacy, such as that of Citizens, presents an even larger 
problem.100  Although these groups do not directly contribute to a 
candidate’s campaign, they may nevertheless influence the outcome of 
an election.101  A candidate may still appear to be obligated to an 
advocacy group for his victory even if not directly associated with the 
group.102  If these groups are successful in obtaining victory for their 
candidate, they create an appearance that the most money can buy a 
judicial seat.103  These groups are especially dangerous because they are 
                                                          
that it is a check on corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).  If campaign contributions 
are publically known, judicial impropriety will be more easily detectible by the press and others.  Id.  
If judges know that they are more likely to get caught, they will be less likely to based their judicial 
decision making on monetary goals.  See id.  Chemerinsky argues that disclosure requirements may 
actually have a destructive effect in judicial campaigns because they allow the judges to have access 
to this information as well.  Chemerinsky supra note 4, at 145.  If judges did not know who 
contributed to their campaigns and in what amount, this could not influence their decision making.  
Id.
  Yet he also argues that eliminating disclosure may not be wise as it would allow judges to 
conduct campaign business outside of the public eye.  Id.
 
 100. Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to 
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 861 (1998) (arguing that because 
they are anonymous and therefore not accountable for their actions, independent groups are more 
likely to be particularly derogatory in their campaign communications).
 
 101. Election EFFORTS PAY OFF: 83% Of Chamber Endorsed Candidates Win (visited Feb. 
10, 2001) <http://www.uschamber.com/Elections/_postelec.htm>.  The chamber attributes this 
victory to the expansions in its endorsement practices in recent years.  Id.
 
 102. Because these groups may play such a large role in influencing the elections, there is no 
reason that candidates would not appear indebted to them as they would to large campaign 
contributors.  Richard L. Hasen, The Suprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and 
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 281 (2000) (“Sham issue 
advocacy has every bit the potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption if it ends with 
‘Call Smith and tell him you don’t like his stand on school vouchers,’ rather than ‘Vote for Jones’”).  
Because donors can contribute to issue advocacy groups in unregulated amounts, the possibility of 
corruption may even be greater than for express advocacy.  Daniel M. Yarmish, Note, The 
Constitutional Bais for a Ban on Soft Money,
 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1280 (1998) (arguing that 
all large contributions of soft money, greater than $100,000 should be completely banned and that 
this action would be constitutionally permissible).  But see Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue 
Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1781-82 
(1999) (arguing that independent advocacy does not present as great a risk of corruption because the 
absence of coordination and inability for the candidate to solicit the contributions somewhat dispels 
suspicion that the candidate and the contributor agreed on the arrangement prior to the contribution).  
This argument is not as convincing in judicial elections as judges are traditionally prohibited from 
personally soliciting their contributions.  See, e.g., OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7(C)(2)(a) (2000). (“a judicial candidate shall not solicit or receive campaign funds [but] . . . may 
establish a committee to secure and manage the expenditure of funds”). 
 103. This is evidenced by the increase in judicial campaign spending in recent years.  See 
supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.  But see Election EFFORTS PAY OFF: 83% Of Chamber 
Endorsed Candidates Win (visited Feb. 10, 2001) 
<http://www.uschamber.com/Elections/_postelec.htm>.  The Chamber claims that they were able to 
prevail in most of these elections despite the efforts of a “better-funded and better- organized 
opponent.”  Id.  The chamber reports that labor unions spent more than 56 million dollars on their 
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often not subject to mandatory campaign disclosures.104 
C.  Actual Impropriety 
Judges are merely human beings in black robes.  They are subject 
to all the pressures as ordinary men and women.  Occasionally these 
forces will overcome them and lead them to make judicial decisions for 
their own selfish purposes rather than on a legal basis.105  In an effort to 
please “a powerful friend,” a judge’s decisions may be biased.106 
A judge may also be tempted to act out against those who supported 
his opponent.107  In one extreme case, a judge kept a list of attorneys 
who had supported his opponent.108  The judge posted this list on his 
office wall.109  Although it is unclear whether the judge ever acted on 
these outward biases, partiality was likely.110 
D.  The Effect of Impropriety - Actual or Perceived 
Because of the judiciary’s traditional role as independent arbiters, it 
is essential that the public have faith in their ability to be impartial.111  
One of the judicial branch’s main purposes is to protect minority 
ideas.112  Majority ideas are expressed and protected in the traditional 
                                                          
campaign efforts although the chamber does not disclose how much it spent on the election.  Id.
 
 104. See infra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.  However, anonymous communications 
have historically been important to American campaigns.  Vermont Right to Life Comm’n, Inc. v. 
Sorell, 221 F.3d 376, 387 (2d Cir. 2000).  Anonymity allows one to express controversial ideas that 
he might not express if his identity were disclosed.  Id.
 
 105. Clausen, supra note 3, at 57 (recognizing the significance of the temptation created by 
judicial elections).  
 
 106. Id.  These temptations may not fully disappear even if judicial elections did not exist.  See 
Id.
  Judges may also be tempted to compromise their oaths in an effort to gain a future appointment 
to a higher position.  Id. 
 107. James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election 
Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.J. 671, 704 (1989). 
 108. Id.  The judge had previously run for a higher judicial office than the one he currently 
held.  Id.  He lost this race and was therefore bitter towards his opponent and his opponent’s 
supporters.  Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  Several of the attorneys whose names were on the list justifiably asked that the judge 
be recused from hearing their cases because they feared reprisal.  Alfini, supra note 107, at 704.  
Surprisingly all of these motions were denied.  Id. 
 111. Levien, supra note 7, at 71.  Levien and Fatka contend that “the very survival of law and 
order in our society is dependant upon public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of every 
sitting jurist in the United States.”  Id.
 
 112. Robert P. Davidow, The Search for Competent and Representative Judges, Continued, 77 
KY. L.J. 723, 732-33 (1989).  Davidow argues that minority ideas are best protected by having a 
representative sample of judges serving on the bench.  Id. at 732.  Persons of different backgrounds 
interpret facts and circumstances differently due to their different beliefs, attitudes and values.  Id. at 
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political model by the elected representatives of the legislative and 
executive branches.113  Judges, however, are controlled by the law and 
often must make decisions independent of the majority’s interests.114  
This role of protector of the minority could be seriously jeopardized if 
judges appear to be controlled by majority ideas.115 
It is also essential that citizens believe that judges are fair and keep 
the justice system functioning effectively.116  An organized system of 
justice is one of the characteristics of a civilized society.117  Fair 
adjudication of cases in the courtroom minimizes the need for vigilante 
justice.118  If people do not feel that they will be treated fairly in a court 
of law, they may be more likely to take matters into their own hands.119  
Because of these possibilities, it is essential that citizens retain 
confidence in the judiciary. 
IV.  FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
Political speech during election campaigns is precisely the type of 
speech that the First Amendment was designed to protect.120  Thus, 
                                                          
733.  Therefore, to have a representative sample of ideologies in the judiciary, there should be a 
representative sample of persons from different backgrounds serving on the bench.  Id.
 
 113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (describing a 
republican form of government as one in which the views of the people are represented through 
their chosen representatives).  This system relies upon the people choosing the proper 
representative.  Id. at 83.  This system also depends on the representatives knowing their 
constituents’ desires and representing them adequately in the legislature.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, 
at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
 114. Nicole C. Allbritain, Comment, One Step Closer to Merit-Based Judicial Selection: 
Ohio’s New Limitations on Judicial Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1323 (1996).  Judges should not face the political pressures that the other branches face because 
judges’ roles in the system are different.  Id. at 1326.  This allows judges to be faithful to the laws 
rather than the whims of the majority.  Id.
 
 115. Id.
 
 116. Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978).
 
 117. Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Extra-judicial 
Self-help or Why Can’t Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane’s Truck, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1221, 1243 
(1998).  Hine argues that without an organized judiciary and law enforcement procedures, classical 
western vigilantism would rise in abundance.  Id. 
 118. Id. at 1226.  Vigilantes believe that the law existed before the people and that the people 
are the source of the law.  Id.  Therefore, if the chosen entity is not fulfilling their responsibility as 
enforcers of the law, vigilantes believe that they are justified in taking the power back from the 
delegated officials.  Id. 
 119. Id. at 1230. Vigilantism also occurs when citizens conclude that the benefits of taking 
matters into their own hands outweighs the potential costs of criminal prosecution. Hine, supra note 
117 at 1230.  To avoid this problem, law enforcement officials should consistently punish 
vigilantism.  Id. at 1243. 
 120. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).  The First Amendment provides that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. CONST. Amend. I.  The Framers 
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restrictions on political speech are generally subject to strict scrutiny 
when reviewed by the courts.121  Therefore, the government must have a 
compelling interest for its restrictions in these areas, and the restrictions 
must be necessary to serve the state’s purpose.122  This burden is difficult 
to meet and because of this heavy burden, much legislation is struck 
down by the courts as unconstitutional.123 
Many types of restrictions have already been analyzed by the 
courts.  The government can not restrict total expenditures by an 
individual or an organization.124  It is permissible, however, for the 
government to restrict expenditures by a corporation.125  Conditioning a 
                                                          
considered political speech and debate to be essential to an informed democracy.  Gora, supra note 
64, at 8-9.  Because of America’s system of representative democracy, it is essential that citizens be 
able to freely discuss candidates and ideas.  Id. at 9.  Voters need to have access to all information 
regarding candidates and issues in order to make informed decisions at the polls.  Id.
 
 121. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  Restrictions on 
contributions have not been held to this high standard as they do not affect the quantity of an 
individual’s speech, but to which groups he can donate.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).  
The individual may still spend as much as he wants independent of other groups.  Id. at 21.  Merely 
contributing to the campaign is the political speech in this context as this is the showing of support 
for the candidate.  Id.  Candidates are likewise able to solicit as much money as they need but they 
are required to do it from a greater number of sources.  Id. at 22.  This limitation on contributions 
also does not impede individuals’ freedom of association.  Id.  
 
 122. Austin, 494 U.S. at 652 (1990). 
 
 123. Restrictions on elections must be examined under a strict analysis.  Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).  The state must justify the restriction with a compelling 
governmental purpose.  Id.  The court must also find that the restriction is necessary to justify 
impeding on the First Amendment rights of voters and candidates for political office.  Id. 
 124. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).  Expenditures have been distinguished from 
contributions which the government may restrict.  Id. at 21.  Expenditures are considered a more 
pure form of speech and do not present the same possibility of impropriety as contributions.  Id. at 
45.  Contributions create a greater chance for actual or potential corruption.  Id. at 25.  Some have 
argued that this distinction should not apply to judicial elections in the same way that it has been 
applied to legislative and executive elections because of the added concern of preserving faith in the 
judiciary.  Levien, supra note 7, at 71.  This argument has actually been rejected by the courts.  
Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1996).  
 
 125. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  Corporate speech is 
still subject to the First Amendment and strict scrutiny.  Id. at 657.  Limiting campaign contributions 
by corporations however is justified by a compelling state interest and therefore does not violate the 
First Amendment.  Id.  at 660.  Corporations have several features that allow them to amass large 
quantities of wealth.  Id.  This ability presents more of a threat of influencing candidates or creating 
an appearance of impropriety.  Id. at 659.  There is also a danger that the views espoused by the 
corporate entity will not be those of the shareholders who actually contributed the wealth.  Id. at 
660.  Corporations are however able to make contributions through separate funds.  Austin, 494 U.S. 
at 660.  States must also make exceptions for certain types of corporations that do not pose these 
identified threats.  North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 714 (4th Cir. 1999).  
When corporations are organized for a political purpose, their members most likely support the 
political message that the group espouses.  Id.  These corporations are also usually not organized for 
profit and do not present the risk associated with the accumulation of wealth.  Id.  Groups that meet 
these two criteria do not pose a threat to the political process, and therefore must be exempt from 
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consensual spending limit on the receipt of government funds is another 
possible limit that courts have held to be constitutional.126  The state may 
require mandatory disclosure of contributors’ names and the amounts 
that they contributed.127  Although the government may not directly 
restrict campaign expenditures, there are several ways in which it may 
indirectly restrict them. 
Also, the state may not limit all of the things that a candidate may 
talk about during an election.128  Most states currently have adopted 
some form of a judicial code of ethics.129  Most of these regulations 
contain, at least, some restriction on judicial speech, either while in 
office or during a campaign.130  Although these restrictions seek to fill 
the laudable goal of preserving judicial integrity, they may likely be 
unconstitutional.131 
                                                          
contribution limitations.  Id.
 
 126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 87 (1976).  Candidates are free to accept or decline this 
offer and therefore are accepting the restriction on expenditures voluntarily.  Id. at 95.
 
 127. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  Disclosure requirements serve several important 
state interests.  Id. at 66.  They allow voters to know the affiliations of candidates.  Id. at 67.  They 
also expose possible corruption to the public eye.  Id.  Finally, they allow the government to 
monitor possible illegal contributions.  Id. at 68.  These substantial concerns outweigh this 
limitation on speech.  Id. at 72.  To avoid vagueness problems this holding only applies to statutes 
requiring disclosure for groups that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a specific candidate.  
Id. at 80.  
 
 128. J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991).  This case recognizes that judicial 
candidates have the same rights to free speech as other candidates and citizens.  Id. at 954-55.  The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky struck down the former ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 
7(B)(1) which prevented judicial candidates from making “pledges or promises of conduct in office 
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; (or) announc[ing] his 
views on disputed legal or political issues.”  Id. at 955.  The court held that this prohibition was not 
narrowly drawn as it prohibited almost all speech by candidates and was therefore unconstitutional.  
Id.
 at 956.
 
 129. See Clausen, supra note 3, at 7.
 
 130. The Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judicial candidates from a variety of 
activities including, making “pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the duties of the office”, making “statements that commit or appear to 
commit the judge or judicial candidate with respect to cases or controversies that are likely to come 
before the court”, and commenting “on any substantive matter relating to a specific pending case on 
the docket of the judge.”  OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(C) (2000).  Provisions such 
as these serve to prevent a judge from deciding an issue before being presented with it in a proper 
factual and legal context.  Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 
144 (1991).  If a judge commits himself prior to hearing the case, he may not be able to consider it 
impartially.  Id.  Even if the result is one that the judge would ultimately have reached, the 
appearance of possible impropriety continues to exist.  Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Beshear v. Butt, 863 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Ark. 1994).  This case involved 
provisions of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibited judicial candidates from 
giving their opinions on “disputed legal or political issues.”  Id. at 916.  The plaintiff claimed that a 
judicial candidate violated this rule by expressing that he would not accept plea bargaining if 
elected.  Id. at 915.  The court held that this provision was overbroad and over vague.  Id. at 917.  It 
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Beyond these constitutional limitations, the state is even more 
limited in how it may regulate groups that are merely engaged in issue 
advocacy.132  The government may not require disclosures of members 
because these activities do not theoretically present the same risk of 
corruption and its appearance.133  Members are also permitted to 
contribute unlimited amounts to a single cause.134  Corporations may 
also contribute to these organizations in unlimited amounts.135 The First 
Amendment prevents the state from regulating many aspects of an issue 
advocacy group that the state can regulate regarding express advocacy 
groups. 
V.  AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
A.  Expand the Definition of Express Advocacy 
Currently express advocacy is narrowly defined by the courts.136  A 
group will not be considered to be engaging in express advocacy unless 
the advocate uses the “magic words,” expressly advocating the election 
or defeat of a specific candidate.137  This definition is, in part, 
                                                          
would be difficult for a candidate to know what speech is prohibited and would excessively 
proscribe speech without a compelling state interest.  Id. at 918.  But see Brunner, supra note 94, at 
734.  Brunner argues that a judge expressing an opinion on a matter that is likely to come before the 
court is akin to issuing an advisory opinion.  Id.  Therefore the prohibition of this activity is not only 
constitutionally permissible, it is constitutionally mandated.  Id.  See also Stretton v. Disciplinary 
Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 143-44 (1991) (upholding Canon 7(B)(1)(c) against 
constitutional challenge as narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest of protecting judicial 
integrity by adopting a restrictive interpretation of the prohibition on expressing views about 
political and legal issues).  
 
 132. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).  Issue advocacy groups do not call for the 
express election or defeat of a specific candidate.  Id.  The purpose of issue advocacy groups is to 
discuss “issues of public concern, including candidates’ positions on those issues - by, among other 
means, distributing voter guides to the general public.”  North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. 
Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1999).  Issue advocacy groups can, however, and often do, 
affect the result of elections.  Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 
1229 (2001).
 
 133. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81.  The state may require disclosure of groups engaging in express 
advocacy in order to further the compelling state interest in preventing the appearance of 
impropriety.  Id. at 72.  The threat of actual or perceived impropriety does not exist when a group is 
merely presenting an issue.  Id. at 81.
 
 134. Hasen, supra note 102, at 267.
 
 135. Id. (identifying that corporations contributed approximately $150 million to issue 
advocacy commercials in 1996).
 
 136. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976).
 
 137. Id.  “[E]xpress words of advocacy of election or defeat” include terms “such as ‘vote for,’ 
‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ [and] 
‘reject.’” Id. at 44 n.52.  These magic words did not appear to be mandatory in Buckley although the 
19
Baker: Is Justice For Sale in Ohio?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
BAKER1.DOC 1/2/02  1:34 PM 
178 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
constitutionally mandated.138  The definition cannot be expanded greatly 
or it will run the risk of becoming overbroad and infringing upon 
constitutionally protected speech.139 
Although the definition of express advocacy could not and should 
not be considerably expanded, it should be expanded as much as 
constitutionally permissible.140  Any new test in this area must 
adequately balance two competing interests: 1) The interest groups’ 
valid interest in protecting their constitutional right to free speech;141 and 
2) the state’s legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial 
system.142 
                                                          
Court later stated that they were a requirement.  Federal Elections Comm’n v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc., 497 U.S. 238, 249 (1986).  The communications at issue in this case urged 
voters to vote “pro-life” and identified “pro-life” candidates.  Id.  Although it did not support a 
specific candidate, the Court held that the ads constituted express advocacy.  Id.  
   The magic words test has been exalted by other courts as a clear bright line rule.  Perry v. 
Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1229 (2001).  Without this bright line 
standard, it would be difficult for courts to accurately discern the intent of the advocacy group.  Id. 
at 161.  Removal of the bright line test may also have a chilling effect on groups who fear 
mandatory disclosures but wish to engage in issue advocacy.  Id.
 
 138. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.  The Court was concerned that a broad definition could 
encompass issue advocacy as well which is not justified by a compelling state interest.  Id.  
Disclosure of issue advocacy is not needed because it does not create the appearance of impropriety 
and does not reflect upon the type of people who support the candidate.  Id. at 81.  
 
 139. Id.  The circuit courts have also been reluctant to expand the definition of express 
advocacy.  See, e.g., Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1229 
(2001).  Perry is factually quite similar to the Resnick case.  Id.  An issue advocacy group, Farmers 
for Fairness, ran advertisements that specifically named candidates and spoke negatively of them 
but did not use any express words of advocacy.  Id. at 159.  The court held North Carolina’s statute 
unconstitutionally overbroad, because it did not require the magic words of express advocacy before 
requiring a group to make campaign disclosures.  Id. at 161.  See also North Carolina Right to Life, 
Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999).
 
 140. This is needed to prevent anonymous attacks on judicial integrity such as that presented 
by the Resnick-O’Donnell race.  Clever groups could easily circumvent the current regulations.  
Glenn J. Moramarco, Beyond “Magic words”: Using Self-Disclosure to Regulate Electioneering, 49 
CATH. U. L. REV. 107, 119 (1999).  But see Hasen, supra note 102, at 281 (arguing that disclosure 
requirements for issue advocacy would probably not prevent derogatory ads by advocacy groups). 
 141. Buckley v. Valeo, 424, U.S. 1, 79 (1976).  Anonymity is a valuable tool for some political 
groups.  Rachel J. Grabow, Note, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: Protecting the Freedom 
of Speech or Damaging the Electoral Process?, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 565, 572-74 (1997).  
Anonymity can be used for positive purposes such as criticizing the government or proposing 
controversial reform.  Id. at 573.  If these individuals were forced to disclose their identities, or 
knew of this possibility, they may be less likely to engage in the political process.  Id.  This choice 
to remain anonymous is an integral part of free speech.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 342 (1995).  Although the Framers often relied on anonymity, there is little evidence that 
they considered it to be a constitutional right.  Grabow, supra, at 597-98.
 
 142. Levien, supra note 7, at 85 (arguing that “preserving the independence and integrity of the 
judiciary” may be a compelling state interest).  See also Landmark Communications, Inc. 
v.Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978) (recognizing that protecting judicial integrity is a valid state 
concern, but that it is not sufficient to prevent newspapers from publishing articles regarding 
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One way to expand express advocacy is to include any expenditure 
that identifies a specific candidate by name and could purport to serve no 
reasonable goal other than to elect or defeat that candidate.  This 
definition is likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.143  The definition 
will probably not burden constitutionally protected speech.144  Groups 
are still able to adequately discuss issues without crossing over into 
express advocacy.145  This definition better serves the purposes of the 
express-issue distinction because it will be more successful in restricting 
speech likely to create the appearance of impropriety while also 
protecting pure issue advocacy.146 
                                                          
possibly groundless or frivolous complaints of judicial misconduct). 
  The benefits of disclosure also include preventing fraudulent and false statements.  
Grabow, supra note 141.  One acting anonymously is more likely to commit fraud as he knows that 
he is unlikely to be caught.  Id. at 607.  The United States also has a longstanding tradition of 
requiring disclosure in campaign materials.  Id. at 599.
 
 143. This standard captures the essence of Buckley’s spirit of restraint.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976).  In Vermont Right to Life Comm’n, Inc. v. Sorrell, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals was faced with a standard similar to the proposed standard.  221 F.3d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 
2000).  This district court interpreted the Vermont law requiring disclosure for express advocacy 
groups to include any group that “expressly or without doubt or reservation advocate[d] the victory 
or defeat of a candidate.”  Id.  Because the court disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of 
the word “implicitly” in the statute, it did not have occasion to rule on whether the district court’s 
proposed standard would withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Id.  It is difficult to know, however, 
whether expansions of the definition of express advocacy would be upheld because of the Supreme 
Court’s failure to address this issue since Buckley in 1976.  Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, 
Political Disclosure and the First Amendment, 33 AKRON L. REV. 71, 79 (1999).  The lower courts’ 
interpretations of these standards have also not been fully coherent.  Id. at 105. 
 144. This proposed standard is barely more broad than the “magic words” standard.  It would 
still easily exclude protected issue advocacy.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).  It 
merely expands the definition of express slightly to prevent clever express advocacy groups from 
clearly advocating the defeat of a candidate by presenting the candidate derogatorily without saying 
the word “defeat.”
 
 145. David A. Pepper, Recasting the Issue Ad: The Failure of the Court’s Issue Advocacy 
Standards,
 100 W. VA. L. REV. 141, 183 (1997) (arguing for the adoption of a reasonable person 
standard rather than the current magic words standard).  Under this standard an advertisement would 
be considered to be express advocacy if a reasonable person viewing the ad in context would 
conclude that it advocates the election of a specific candidate.  Id. at 179. 
  But see BeVier, supra note 102, at 1771.  BeVier argues that although standards similar to 
the proposed standard are most likely not overbroad, they may present problems of vagueness.  Id.  
Groups are significantly less likely to know if they are subject to regulation than they would under 
the magic words standard.  Id. 
 146. Other expansions of express advocacy have been suggested.  Hasen, supra note 102, at 
279.  Hasen analyzes Richard Briffault’s bright-line proposal regulating communications that 
clearly identify a candidate, expend a large sum of money and occur within a specified time of the 
election.  Id.  Hasen concludes that although this standard is most likely not void for vagueness, it is 
may be overbroad in that it could reach protected forms of issue advocacy such as advertisements 
urging an incumbent to take action on an issue.  Id.  Hasen however urges that it is more desirable to 
regulate a few additional expenditures than to allow the current problem to continue.  Id. at 281.  
This proposal is similar to those also proposed by Congress.  Moramarco, supra note 140, at 124.   
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In addition, this rule will not be as simple for special interest groups 
to circumvent.147  As the Resnick case makes clear, the “magic words” 
standard could easily be avoided.148  As long as groups do not use one of 
these terms, they can freely express any derogatory idea while hiding 
behind the guise of issue advocacy.149  The new standard would create 
more discretion for judicial decision makers.150  It will allow the state to 
require disclosure when it is abundantly clear that the advertisement is 
advocating for the election or defeat of a named candidate, even without 
expressly stating this purpose.151 
As applied to the Resnick-O’Donnell race, the new standard would 
classify Citizens and the United States Chamber of Commerce as 
express advocacy groups.  All of their advertisements specifically named 
Justice Resnick152 and identified her as a justice who changes her vote 
based on campaign contributions, makes biased decisions and does not 
care about proper education.153  These qualities are certainly not positive 
ones for a judge to possess.  The combination of these characteristics 
would lead any reasonable person to conclude that this judge does not 
deserve a vote to remain in office.154  No other logical conclusion could 
                                                          
Another proposed solution allows the groups themselves to designate whether their advertisements 
are express or issue advocacy.  Id. at 127.  If the government believes that a group has made the 
wrong designation, it may challenge the group’s choice.  Id.  The government would then be 
required to prove that the group intended to influence the outcome of the election using objective 
criteria such as: 1) using the candidate’s name; 2) the time span between the communication and the 
election; 3) the method of communicating the message; and 4) the amount spent on the 
advertisement.  Id.  If the government proves that the group intended to influence the outcome of the 
election, the group may be fined for making the untruthful designation.  Id. 
 147. Pepper, supra note 145, at 179.  The magic words standard made it simple for advocacy 
groups to determine whether their communications constituted express advocacy.  Id.  The 
reasonable person standard requires more analysis to make this determination.  Id. 
 148. See supra notes 15-73 and accompanying text.
 
 149. Moramarco, supra note 140, at 119 (identifying the ease with which groups could 
circumvent regulation by avoiding certain words in their campaign communications).  Issue 
advocacy groups freely admit that their participation in election propaganda “can and does influence 
the outcome of elections.”  Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 159 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 
S.Ct. 1229 (2001). 
 
 150. See Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Is Soft Money Here to Stay under the “Magic 
Words” Doctrine?”, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 43-44 (1998).  Judges must still be careful to 
construe the new definition narrowly in order to avoid a chilling effect on constitutionally protected 
speech.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976).
 
 151. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
 
 152. See supra notes 15-73 and accompanying text.
 
 153. Id.
 
 154. This reasonableness standard allow the viewer to regard the communication as a whole 
rather than simply the language.  Pepper, supra note 145, at 179.  The images and the temporal 
context of the advertisement should also be considered.  Id.  As applied to this case, the imagery of 
the advertisement was clearly derogatory especially when coupled with the language.  The ads also 
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be drawn.  The new standard adequately protects all competing interests 
in this case and in others that could be presented.155 
B.  Merit Selection and Retention: “The Missouri Plan” 
Many campaign disclosure problems could be avoided by 
abandoning the system of judicial elections.156  Several other states have 
already adopted a system of merit selection and retention.157  In this 
system, a committee typically nominates several candidates for 
judgeships.158  One of these persons is appointed by the governor of the 
state to fill the vacancy.159  The newly appointed judge will fulfill his 
duties for a specified number of years.160  He will then run in a retention 
election at which the people will vote on whether he should retain his 
position or be replaced by a new appointee.161 
The merit selection and retention process has several advantages.  
The most obvious benefit is that merit selection will greatly reduce the 
likelihood of derogatory judicial elections.162  Merit selection may result 
in more minority and woman judges being selected for judgeships.163  It 
                                                          
began to air close to the election which suggests that they were intended to influence its result. 
 155. See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
 
 156. Although retention elections are usually held in states that have adopted merit selection, 
these elections do not generally present the same problems as traditional contested elections.  
Averill, supra note 24, at 300. 
  There are also some benefits of judicial elections that would be lost with a switch to merit 
selection.  Barnett, supra note 78.  Judicial election may result in judges who are more sensitive to 
the needs of the community.  Id. at 417.  Elections are also generally supported by the democratic 
ideal.  Id.
 
 157. Barnett, supra note 78, at 416.  Sixteen states are currently using merit selection to 
appoint judges to the bench.  Id.  More states are also considering changing to a merit selection 
system.  Allbritain, supra note 114, at 1330. 
 158. See Barnett, supra note 78 at 416.  The committee is typically composed of citizens of 
various backgrounds, including those both inside and outside the legal profession.  Id.  The 
committee also researches the history and background of these candidates, including their 
profession and personal lives. Id. 
 
 159. Id.  The committee will submit its recommendations along with all of the information that 
it has compiled.  Id.
 
 160. Id.
 
 161. Id.  These elections are not contested by an opponent.  Id.  The citizens merely have the 
option of choosing “yes” to retain the judge or “no” to have him replaced by the committee.  Id.  
Robert P. Davidow argues that these retention elections should not be held as they reduce the 
representativeness of the judiciary.  Davidow, supra note 112, at 739.  Although selection of judges 
by committee allows minorities to have a greater voice in judicial selection, retention elections 
allow the majority to remove these appointees for expressing minority viewpoints.  Id. at 735.
 
 162. Barnett, supra note 78 at 416.  This will definitely reduce the cost of judicial elections 
which has greatly increased in recent years.  See supra notes 4 to 9 and accompanying text.
 
 163. Barnett, supra note 78 at 419.  This contention however is not undisputed and several 
studies have come to conflicting conclusions.  Id.  Although merit selection may increase the 
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may also result in a more diverse make-up of Court’s in other ways, such 
as more individuals vying for positions because they are not confronted 
with the pressures of an election.164  Merit selection also reduces the 
amount of time that judges must spend campaigning.165  It is possible 
that these advantages may increase the quality of the judicial body.166 
Despite these advantages, it is unlikely that merit selection will be 
successful in Ohio.167  It has been suggested twice, but rejected by the 
voters.168  Although the Ohio Bar Association and many other groups 
supported the change, its opponents, including the AFL-CIO, were 
successful in defeating the proposal as contrary to Ohioans’ inherent 
right to vote.169  However, there is still a possibility for judicial reform as 
it also did not come to other states without a fight.170 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
One thing is clear from the evidence presented in this Comment—
there is a need for reform in the judicial election process in Ohio.  The 
Resnick-O’Donnell race is merely one glaring example of the problem.  
The current law of campaign disclosure is not sufficient to protect the 
integrity of Ohio’s judiciary.  This integrity is essential to the 
functioning of the judicial system.  Although Justice Resnick prevailed 
in the race, despite the attack on her honor, the scar on the judicial 
system, as a whole, remains. 
Two possible solutions to this problem have been suggested to 
                                                          
presence of minorities on the bench, some argue that the judiciary will still not be sufficiently 
representative.  See Davidow, supra note 112 at 725, n.9.  This is due to the existence of retention 
elections and the appointment of the selection committee by a partisan official, usually the 
governor.  Id.
 
 164. Barnett supra note 78 at 418.  Although many people may want to become judges and 
would perform well at the position, they may be turned off by the prospect of campaign speeches 
and propaganda.  Id.  Also, the qualifications that make a good politician are not necessarily the 
same as those that make a good judges.  Id.
 
 165. Averill, supra note 24, at 296. 
 
 166. Id. at 418.  The committee’s deep investigation into the candidate’s history and 
background may also result in higher quality judges initially appointed to the bench.  Id.  This is in 
comparison to voters, who know little to nothing about the candidates and their beliefs, making the 
decision.  Id. Performance evaluations of judges will also be used by the committee whereas they 
are rarely used in judicial elections.  Id. at 316.  Merit selection may also alleviate instability in state 
courts that may be attributable to judicial elections.  Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the 
Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1458-59 
(1998).
 
 167. Felice, supra note 97. 
 168. Id. at 193. 
 169. Id. at 199. 
 170. Averill, supra note 24, at 325. 
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solve this problem.  First, the groups for which disclosures are currently 
required could be expanded.  Although this may not be a dramatic 
change due to important constitutional limitations, the expansion may be 
enough to protect the judiciary from anonymous attack.  However, a 
more dramatic change in the structure of elections may be necessary.  
The second option then is changing to a system of merit selection and 
retention because this system would prevent many, but not all, of the 
problems associated with judicial elections.  Although no solution is 
perfect, changes must be made before justice truly is for sale in Ohio. 
Kara Baker 
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